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 In order to develop a literary aesthetics of war crime, I examine the phe-
nomenon of moral immunity in military memoir. Using three paradig-
matic examples of memoirs of unjust wars characterised by the routine 
perpetration of war crimes, I argue that moral immunity is achieved 
by means of three literary devices: literary irresponsibility, ethical peer-
age, and moral economy. I then employ the proposed literary aesthet-
ics of war crime to provide an answer to the perennial question of the 
relationship between literature and morality as well as to two specifi c 
instantiations of this question, the value interaction debate in literary 
aesthetics and the ethics of reading in literary theory. My conclusion is 
that the literary aesthetics of war crime demonstrates both that there is 
a systematic relationship between aesthetic value and moral value and 
that there is no systematic relationship between literary ambiguity and 
moral uncertainty.
Keywords: Autobiography; colonialism; moral value; philosophy of 
literature; war.
1. Introduction
The value interaction debate and the ethical turn in criticism both ad-
dress the perennial question of the relationship between art and moral-
ity, the fi rst from the perspective of analytic aesthetics and the second 
from the perspective of literary theory. The value interaction debate 
has not been restricted to literature, although it has been primarily 
concerned with works of narrative art and, in consequence, literature 
and fi lm (McGregor 2014: 450). As one might expect from the distinct 
approaches, literary aesthetics has focused on the specifi c issue of 
whether a moral defect in a work is (also) an aesthetic defect while 
literary theory has explored the ethics of reading, the relationship be-
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tween literary responsiveness and ethical responsibility in the recep-
tion of texts, more broadly.1 Where the relation between moral and lit-
erary defects has thus far been debated almost entirely in short form 
and almost exclusively restricted to fi ction, the relationship between 
responsiveness and responsibility has been explored in both articles 
and monographs and included both fi ction and nonfi ction.2 Tess Mc-
Nulty (2018: 384) notes that although the value interaction debate and 
ethical turn in criticism were contemporaneous, the philosophical and 
critical movements have remained almost entirely independent of each 
other for two decades. She characterises the former as examining the 
relationship between aesthetic reception and ethical thinking in terms 
of the success (or failure) of works to produce their intended effects and 
the latter as examining that relationship in terms of the distinction be-
tween ambiguity and edifi cation on the one hand and didacticism and 
indoctrination on the other hand.
McNulty proposes a rapprochement of literary aesthetics and liter-
ary theory by employing tools from the former to debunk a conclusion 
in the latter. She uses the analytic concepts of uptake, failed uptake, 
and imaginative resistance to argue that—contrary to received critical 
wisdom—there is no systematic relationship between either ambigu-
ity and uncertainty or between didacticism and conformity. In other 
words, McNulty demonstrates that sophisticated ambiguity does not 
necessarily produce the moral uncertainty characteristic of the ethical 
knowledge conveyed by literature (and, similarly, that simplistic di-
dacticism does not necessarily produce the conformity associated with 
literature as a vehicle for politics). There is no corresponding received 
aesthetic wisdom, although the recent history of the value interaction 
debate has been dominated by two theories, moderate moralism and 
robust immoralism. The former, with which Noël Carroll (1996: 236) 
initiated the debate, holds that a moral defect can be an aesthetic de-
fect in a work of literature. The latter, introduced by A.W. Eaton (2012: 
290), holds that a moral defect can be an aesthetic merit in a work of 
literature. While the positions appear compatible Eaton is clear that 
they are not, as they both argue for a systematic relation between spe-
cifi c kinds of moral defect and aesthetic value—reaching conclusions in 
opposite directions.
My approach is fi rmly anchored in literary aesthetics, but my meth-
od involves the extension of its analytic concepts to a practice or genre 
to which it is not usually applied, i.e. to nonfi ction.3 In this particular 
combination of approach and method, I take my lead from Sarah Worth 
1 For the purpose of this paper, I assume that there is a strong relation between 
aesthetic value and literary value (value qua literature), i.e. aesthetic value is at the 
very least a signifi cant component of literary value.
2 The two publications that initiated the respective debates are exemplary in this 
regard; see: Carroll (1996) and Miller (1987).
3 For paradigmatic examples of these two approaches to fi ction, see: Lamarque 
and Olsen (1994) and Friend (2012).
 R. McGregor, A Literary Aesthetics of War Crime 137
(2017: 39–67), who shifts the focus of the debate about the values of 
literature from its previous emphasis on the values of fi ction to an ex-
amination of what is distinctive about nonfi ction. One of the conse-
quences of this shift is to prioritise the distinction between narrative 
and non-narrative representation over the distinction between fi ctional 
and nonfi ctional representation and while my literary aesthetics of war 
crime is not reliant on this priority, I do endorse it. In the course of her 
argument for the value of reading fi ction, Worth (2017: 101) uses mem-
oir as a case study of a blended genre: ‘Memoir shares qualities of both 
fi ction (because of its literary style, prose, character developments, and 
plot formations) and nonfi ction (because it is all supposed to be true).’ 
I shall also focus on memoir, specifi cally on military memoir. Where 
McNulty integrates literary aesthetics with literary theory by employ-
ing analytic concepts from the former to debunk a conclusion in the 
latter, I employ analytic concepts to life writing, a practice or genre 
that is standardly explored by means of literary theory. My proposal 
for a literary aesthetics of war crime will then provide a solution to 
both the value interaction debate and the ethics of reading, as well as 
a characterisation of the relationship between literature and morality 
more generally.
2. Moral immunity
The literal meaning of biography is life-writing and life writing is a 
term employed to describe practices that include, but are not restricted 
to, the writing of letters, diaries, memoirs, autobiographies, and bi-
ographies. Hermione Lee (2009: 5) uses the following defi nition of bi-
ography as her starting point: ‘Biography is the story of a person told 
by someone else.’ Linda Anderson (2011: 6–8) traces the fi rst use of 
‘autobiography’ to the end of the eighteenth century and notes that a 
hierarchy of self-representation was quickly established in which auto-
biographies were regarded as more valuable than memoirs in virtue of 
their greater seriousness, which was in turn a function of prioritising 
teleology over chronology. Laura Marcus (1994: 3) identifi es the greater 
value associated with autobiographies over confessional writing and 
memoir on the basis that the former are ‘“sincere”’, understood as ex-
ploring the totality of the self. She notes that autobiography is a fun-
damentally hybrid and unstable genre, bridging divides between sub-
ject and object, private and public, fi ction and fact, and literature and 
history. This is refl ected in the many varieties and experiments with 
autobiography that have occurred since the term was fi rst used, from 
William Wordsworth’s The Prelude or, Growth of a Poet’s Mind; An 
Autobiographical Poem (1805), a blank verse poem of fourteen books, 
to J. M. Coetzee’s Summertime (2009), an autobiography that combines 
fi ction with fact and is written in the third person.
I delineate autobiographies as, paradigmatically: (1) narrative rep-
resentations, (2) narrated in the fi rst person, (3) with an identity of (a) 
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author, (b) narrator, and (c) protagonist, (4) all of whom are real people. 
Within this genre, I conceive of memoir as a subcategory that typically 
shares all four of the above characteristics and typically represents a 
part rather than the whole of the author’s life, in consequence of which 
it may lack the seriousness (teleological) and sincerity (exploratory) 
associated with autobiography. John Gibson (2012: 109) describes au-
tobiography as ‘one of the last unexplored frontiers in literary aesthet-
ics’ and I concur with this assessment. I have selected military mem-
oirs as an especially ethically problematic kind of memoir and selected 
three extreme cases, where the wars involved are unjust and where the 
authors are either active participants in or passive witnesses to war 
crimes. I do not offer a defi nition of unjust war, but take the colonial 
confl ict in George Robert Elford’s Devil’s Guard (1971) and the white 
supremacist wars in Peter McAleese’s No Mean Soldier: The Autobi-
ography of a Professional Fighting Man (1993) to be uncontroversially 
unjust. I take the Iraq War in James Ashcroft’s Making a Killing: The 
Explosive Story of a Hired Gun in Iraq (2006) unjust in virtue of the 
widespread scepticism concerning its legality (Chilcot 2016). I take war 
crimes to include any act in breach one of any of the four Geneva Con-
ventions of 1949 or their three Additional Protocols of 1977 and 2005 
(ICRC 2020).
Devil’s Guard may be the most disclaimed book ever, beginning 
with a Publisher’s Note that distances the publisher from the point of 
view expressed in the memoir and an Introduction in which the author, 
George Robert Elford (a pseudonym), abdicates from any moral respon-
sibility for reproducing the story of the narrator and protagonist, Hans 
Josef Wagemueller (also a pseudonym), a junior offi cer in the Waffen-
SS in the Second World War and in the Légion étrangère in the First 
Indochina War. The memoir is a curious and complex mélange of fi ction 
and fact. On the one hand, the book has been widely denounced as Neo-
Nazi fi ction and its two sequels were published as war fi ction (Elford 
1988, 1991; Gibbons-Neff 2017). On the other hand, there is evidence 
both that the Foreign Legion allowed the many German volunteers to 
serve together and that fi fty of the original members of the 36. Waffen-
Grenadier-Division der SS (Wagemueller’s unit, thinly-disguised in the 
memoir) not only survived the war, but escaped prosecution for war 
crimes (Windrow 2018; Ingrao 2006). The memoir demonstrates an un-
deniable familiarity with the operational tactics of the 36th Waffen-SS 
Division and there are many passages whose authenticity is verifi ed by 
more rigorous military histories (see: Fall 1961). As such, I shall treat 
the memoir in the same manner as the other two while recognising that 
some of the content is likely fi ctional.
No Mean Soldier is closer to an autobiography than a memoir, 
beginning with Peter McAleese’s birth in 1942 and chronicling the 
next fi fty years of his life. I shall focus on his military service for two 
white supremacist regimes from 1977 to 1983, for Ian Smith’s Rhode-
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sian Front government during the Rhodesian Bush War and then for 
P. W. Botha’s National Party government during the South African 
Border War (chapters six to eight of twelve). McAleese is credited as 
the author ‘with Mark Bles’ and copyright is shared by the two. As 
the use of his name disqualifi es Bles from being a ghostwriter, I take 
the relationship between Bles and McAleese to be similar to that be-
tween Elford and Wagemueller (and Ashcroft and Thurlow below), i.e. 
the former was responsible for the form of the work and the latter for 
its content. No Mean Soldier should not be confused with Beyond No 
Mean Soldier: The Explosive Recollection of A Special Forces Operator! 
(McAleese 2015), which is actually a second edition of the autobiog-
raphy. McAleese joined the Parachute Regiment of the British Army 
at the age of seventeen and became one of the youngest men to pass 
selection for the Special Air Service (SAS) a mere two years later. He 
was dismissed from the SAS twice for drunken brawling, completed 
his military service in 1969, and received three custodial sentences for 
intimate partner violence over the next seven years. He began a career 
as mercenary in 1976, fi ghting with the infamous Colonel Callan in the 
Angolan War of Independence, as a foreign volunteer in the Rhodesian 
Security Forces and the South African Army, and as a mercenary again 
in Colombia from 1988 to 1989, where he was contracted to assassinate 
Pablo Escobar.
Making a Killing is a memoir of James Ashcroft’s (a pseudonym) 
work as a contractor for a UK-based private military company (PMC) 
called Spartan (a disguised name) from September 2003 to March 
2005. He is the product of Winchester School and the University of 
Oxford and served in the British Army as an infantry offi cer from 1992 
to 1998. The narrative begins with Ashcroft in his mid-thirties, giv-
ing up a career in law in the City of London to satisfy his longing to 
return to the adventure of military life. In Baghdad, Ashcroft joins a 
team of fi ve other mercenaries, all ex-soldiers in their forties: Seamus 
and Les, former senior non-commissioned offi cers in the British Army; 
and Hendriks, Kobus, and Etienne, former special forces operators in 
the South African Army. He completes three contracts with the team 
over the next eighteen months: providing personal security for foreign 
journalists, escorting oil tankers from Kuwait to Baghdad, and train-
ing a security force to protect the city’s water supply. Ashcroft and his 
professional collaborator, Clifford Thurlow, published a sequel, Escape 
from Baghdad: First Time Was For the Money, This Time It’s Person-
al, in 2009. Unlike the prequel, Escape from Baghdad is lacking in 
authenticity and I take the pair of books to follow the pattern of the 
Devil’s Guard series, i.e. whatever the relationship between narrative 
and history in the fi rst, it is substantially looser in the second.
In spite of—or perhaps, more accurately, in consequence of—the 
criminal wars and war crimes represented in each of these memoirs, 
the authors (by which I refer to Wagemueller, McAleese, and Ashcroft 
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respectively) seek some kind of acquittal, amnesty, or absolution from 
their readers. This can be understood as a straightforward desire to 
avoid being judged as morally abhorrent, which seems a minimal re-
quirement if the reader is to accept the author’s invitation to the read 
the narrative qua memoir, i.e. with an interest in the life of the author 
as opposed to a historical interest in the wars represented or a crimi-
nological interest in the crimes represented. I shall call this authorial 
intention, that reader engagement with the work is characterised by 
some degree of identifi cation, empathy, or sympathy, moral immu-
nity. In the remainder of this paper, I argue that moral immunity is 
achieved by the deployment of three distinct devices: literary irrespon-
sibility, ethical peerage, and moral economy. In literary aesthetic ter-
minology, these devices are all aesthetic merits employed in a mor-
ally defective manner, i.e. inventive design features intended to diffuse 
moral responsibility. In literary critical terminology, the devices are all 
sophisticated instantiations of ambiguity employed to a simplistic di-
dactic end, i.e. inventive uses of language intended to justify white (or 
Western) supremacism. McNulty (2018: 384) notes that sophisticated 
ambiguity has standardly been associated with modernist or canonical 
texts so its perhaps surprising appearance in these memoirs evinces 
Gibson’s claim about the lack of philosophical exploration of autobiog-
raphy.
3. Literary irresponsibility
In ‘Fiction and the Nonfi ction Novel’, Peter Lamarque (2014: 83–84) es-
tablishes a taxonomy of the relationship between fi ction and nonfi ction 
in the novel. His taxonomy identifi es six categories of novel, includ-
ing paradigmatic fi ction, paradigmatic nonfi ction, and the nonfi ction 
novel. Paradigmatic nonfi ction includes biographies, autobiographies, 
and memoirs, which may be more or less literary in the relationship 
between their form and content. ‘Nonfi ction novel’ was coined by Tru-
man Capote to describe his In Cold Blood: A True Account of a Multiple 
Murder and Its Consequences (1966) and presents nonfi ctional content 
in the form of a novel, i.e. using the literary techniques associated with 
paradigmatic fi ction in order to increase the work’s impact on read-
ers (Lamarque 2014: 88). Lamarque’s (2014: 98) objection to nonfi ction 
novels is the moral irresponsibility of the authors:
The “nonfi ction novelist” cannot have it both ways: cannot claim the high 
ground of the serious reporter or historian and also the imaginativeness and 
inventiveness of the novelist. There is a moral dimension here as well as a 
theoretical tension between practices.
Lamarque criticises authors such as Capote, Norman Mailer, and 
Tom Wolfe for writing realist novels in the tradition of Tobias Smol-
lett, Charles Dickens, and Evelyn Waugh (paradigmatic fi ction), but 
claiming the accuracy of the representation of reality associated with 
biography, autobiography, and memoir (paradigmatic nonfi ction). This 
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critique can be extended beyond the specifi c criticism of writing one 
type of novel in the guise of another to a more general literary device, 
towards which Lamarque (2014: 103) gestures in his summary of his 
argument:
where authors deliberately conceal their intentions, apparently inviting re-
sponse under one set of norms (e.g., serious reporting) while hiding behind 
the privileges of another (e.g. literary licence), then, as we saw, the question 
of moral responsibility inevitably comes up.
I shall refer to the deliberate misrepresentation of literary content for 
the purpose of inviting response under an inappropriate set of norms 
as literary irresponsibility.
Devil’s Guard is a eulogy for National Socialism, an apologia for 
colonialism, and a polemic for the escalation of United States’ involve-
ment in the Second Indochina War. By the time of its publication, the 
waging of that war was two years into its Vietnamization phase, an 
exit strategy that was justifi ed on the basis of the Army of the Republic 
of Vietnam being strong enough to win the war on its own (Wiest 2002: 
50–51). This context is signifi cant as there is a much closer relation-
ship between the military and political aspects of Devil’s Guard than 
the other two examples, which for the most part focus on the trials, 
tensions, and thrills of contact with the enemy. The polemical inten-
tion behind the novel is literally rather than fi guratively staged in the 
twelfth chapter (of eighteen), titled ‘Dialogue with an Agitator’ (Elf-
ord 1971: 221). Wagemueller describes a raid on a Viêt  Minh village in 
which sixteen insurgents have been found drunk and incapable. Fol-
lowing the battalion’s standard operating procedure, the Legionnaires 
execute the insurgents, bayoneting them to death while they are asleep 
to avoid wasting ammunition. When a Chinese commissar and his Viêt 
Minh deputy are captured while trying to escape, Wagemueller decides 
to take the advice of one of his offi cers, Erich Schulze, who suggests 
that a public debate with the prisoners will provide an entertaining 
interlude from the routine of operations. The bulk of the chapter (elev-
en of fourteen pages) comprises a discussion in which Schulze and his 
comrade, Bernard Eisner, engage the two commissars in a superfi cial 
(but nonetheless serious) elenchus aimed at proving the political, ethi-
cal, and economic superiority of capitalism over communism. The Chi-
nese commissar, Kwang, is allowed to expound on the merits of commu-
nism at length and is even provided with a drink of water to facilitate 
further pontifi cation. Schulze brings the debate to a close once he feels 
he has refuted Kwang’s argument and honours his word by releasing 
both commissars from custody.
While the debate is in progress, Wagemueller refl ects on its impact 
(Elford 1971: 232):
The villagers listened in utter silence; their faces betrayed no emotion—
only alertness. Some of the elder men were listening so intently that their 
mouths hung open and their eyes appeared transfi xed on Schulze. I was 
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not sure if all that Erich [Schulze] said had reached the people, and if so, 
how deeply his words had penetrated into their simple minds. I was sure of 
only one thing, that never before had they witnessed someone challenging 
the Viet Minh platform openly, in front of people. They had never heard 
someone denouncing the holiest of the Communist prophets and everything 
they stood for. No one could ever call a Viet Minh leader a liar and live to 
tell the story. Besides, no French offi cer in Indochina had ever bothered 
to talk to les sauvages on equal terms, and certainly not about political or 
economic issues.
There are several unintended ironies in this passage, not the least of 
which is Wagemueller’s criticism of his French comrades for referring 
to the Vietnamese as savages mere sentences after he himself has re-
ferred to them as simple. While the debate provides a curious interlude 
in a narrative that is otherwise almost completely focused on combat 
operations, it is important to recognise its signifi cance within Wage-
mueller’s narration. When the Legionnaires learn that the Viêt Minh 
subsequently executed thirty people in the village, Wagemueller specu-
lates that it was because they had repeated Schulze’s argument. For all 
the incongruity of the debate, it constitutes an explicit justifi cation of 
the German presence in Vietnam. The incident is, in fact, a clear case 
of literary irresponsibility because notwithstanding the bookending of 
the debate between two sets of war crimes (the execution of the insur-
gents and the execution of the villagers), the dialogue is represented 
as a genuine and legitimate exploration of two opposing views. Indeed, 
as the debate progresses, it is easy to forget that the commissars are 
being interrogated at gunpoint, uttering what they believe to be their 
last words.
A recurring rhetorical strategy in military memoir is the use of hu-
mour to represent situations that are either terrifying, tragic, or both. 
This of course refl ects the way in which soldiers and non-combatants 
deal with repeated exposure to the threat of death, permanent injury, 
and capture. The representation of terror or tragedy in a humorous 
manner deploys literary irresponsibility when the humour is used to 
characterise the events rather than the author’s response to those 
events, i.e. when the reader is invited to fi nd the events themselves 
rather than the author’s response amusing. McAleese makes occasion-
al use of humour in No Mean Soldier, particularly in the two chapters 
that deal with his service in the Rhodesian Security Forces. The most 
extended example of literary irresponsibility is his narration of an in-
cident at the school in Bindura, a mining town in north-eastern Zim-
babwe (1984) with a population of approximately eighteen thousand, 
at the end of 1979. Over a thousand white Rhodesians, all in formal 
evening dress and heavily-armed, descend on the school hall for the 
annual ball. Once the festivities are underway, two Zimbabwe Afri-
can National Liberation Army (ZANLA) insurgents make a token at-
tack, fi ring a few rounds from their assault rifl es. In response, drunken 
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guests charge from the hall, pouring fi re into the darkness, causing the 
insurgents to withdraw. At the sound of a fi refi ght, however, the Guard 
Force (heavily-armed African security guards), launch a counter-attack 
on what they assume are the insurgents, also fi ring into the darkness. 
The battle between the revellers and their guards lasts for hours, with 
hundreds of rounds fi red. McAleese’s (1993: 149) fi nal observation is: 
‘Bindura looked as though it had been attacked by stormtroopers, with 
bullet strike on walls, smashed windows, shattered door, and riddled 
cars, but, once again, with the luck of the devil, no one was hurt.’ The 
invitation to fi nd the incident amusing belies the fact that it took place 
in a densely-populated urban area in a country that had already suf-
fered fi fteen years of civil war.
In Making a Killing, Ashcroft discusses both his personal motiva-
tion for joining Spartan and the political motivation behind the Coali-
tion Force (CF) invasion of Iraq. I discuss the former in the next sec-
tion. With respect to the latter, he is sceptical about the justifi cation 
provided by the Bush and Blair administrations as well as the way in 
which the subsequent occupation is conducted by the Coalition Provi-
sion Authority (CPA), critical of both phases of the Iraq War (2003–
2011), the invasion (March to May 2003) and the insurgency (2003–
2011). PMCs such as Spartan were involved in the second phase and 
it was this phase that had the most devastating effect on the civilian 
population of Iraq: reliable estimates put civilian casualties during the 
invasion at approximately three thousand seven hundred and fi fty, but 
those during the insurgency at approximately one hundred and twelve 
thousand four hundred and fi fty (Conetta 2003; IBC 2020). Ashcroft is 
well aware of the dire management of the occupation, but nonetheless 
unequivocally frames the role of the PMCs in Iraq as serving the Iraqi 
population rather than the CPA. The following two statements are ex-
plicit, the fi rst made in the fi rst chapter (of twenty-six) and the second 
on the penultimate page of the Afterword:
(1) ‘We were not an occupying force safeguarding the second largest oil re-
serves on the planet. We were rebuilding Iraq to bring security to the Iraqis’ 
(Ashcroft 2006: 6).
(2) ‘The water purifi cation plants I protected prevented outbreaks of ty-
phoid, cholera and gastroenteritis and have directly saved the lives of thou-
sands of Muslim children, the sick and the elderly. PSDs [personal security 
details] don’t get paid to kill people. We get paid to save lives and stay out 
of trouble’ (Ashcroft 2006: 268).
In all three examples (Wagemueller, McAleese, and Ashcroft), literary 
content (interrogation at gunpoint, danger of civilian casualties, and 
sustaining the occupation) is deliberately misrepresented (as political 
debate, a hilarious near-miss, and public service) so as to invite re-
sponse under a more morally-acceptable set of norms. The deployment 
of literary irresponsibility contributes to authorial moral immunity.
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4. Ethical peerage
In the course of her explanation of rational response to ethical dis-
agreement in ‘Literature and Disagreement’, Eileen John (2014: 239) 
contrasts epistemic peers with ethical peers. Using literary examples 
as evidence, she argues that conciliation is a rational response to an 
ethical peer, even when that peer is an epistemic inferior. Epistemic 
peerage is determined by a combination of possessing the relevant 
information and the relevant capabilities and the idea is that if two 
epistemic peers disagree, each has rational grounds for conciliation. In 
the epistemic case, conciliation is contrasted with steadfastness and 
involves an individual either withholding or lowering confi dence in his 
or her initial belief. Ethical peerage is determined by a combination of 
possessing a capacity for ethical judgement and a comparable interest 
in the resolution of the disagreement. In the ethical case, conciliation is 
‘a matter of people revising their reasoning, or seeing the need to revise 
their reasoning, so that even if beliefs remain in place, whether and 
how those beliefs are grasped and supported has shifted in a concilia-
tory way’ (John 2014: 240). The concept of an ethical peer is thus both 
more simple and more complex than that of an epistemic peer. It is sim-
pler because all persons are assumed to be ethical subjects, i.e. to have 
the capacity for ethical judgement and moral responsibility. It is more 
complex because it presupposes the existence of an ethical community, 
which consists of ethical peers whose interests should be acknowledged 
and for whom the ethical judgement should make sense. Signifi cantly, 
the status of ethical peerage is, unlike that of epistemic peerage, deter-
mined by a person’s situation rather than their competence. In the re-
lationship between reader and author, there is an initial assumption of 
ethical peerage and this assumption promotes conciliation rather than 
steadfastness in cases where the reader disagrees with the author’s 
ethical judgement.
McAleese begins No Mean Soldier with two attempts to establish 
himself and his readers as peers in an ethical community, in order to 
gain the trust of his audience prior to disclosing his participation in 
criminal wars and perpetration of war crimes. The front matter of No 
Mean Soldier consists of a half title, title page, copyright, epigraph, 
contents, acknowledgements, and preface. The epigraph (which is very 
likely the fi rst part of the book that will be read) and the preface (which 
is very brief, less than a single page) play a signifi cant role in imme-
diately and effectively inaugurating a relationship of ethical peerage 
between author and reader. I quote the epigraph, which is a quote from 
Theodore Roosevelt (quoted in McAleese 1993: v), in full:
It is not the critic who counts, not the man who points out how the strong 
man stumbled, or where the doer of the deed could have done better. The 
credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena, whose face is marred 
by dust and sweat and blood, who strives valiantly, who errs and comes 
short again and again, because there is no effort without error and short-
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coming, who does actually strive to do the deeds, who knows the great en-
thusiasms and spends himself in a worthy cause, who at best, knows in the 
end the triumph of high achievement, and at worst, if he fails, at least fails 
while daring greatly. His place shall never be with those cold and timid 
souls who knew neither victory nor defeat.
The fi rst three paragraphs of the preface are (McAleese 1993: 1):
Before you start, I want to clear up a couple of points. I’ve always been a 
professional operational soldier and not, repeat not, a “career” soldier of the 
sort who wants only to keep his nose clean and worries about his promotion 
and pension prospects. In fact, I don’t think I made a bad depot soldier when 
necessary, and maybe my turnout has been smarter than most. I wonder 
how many soldiers nowadays bother to iron creases into their combat uni-
forms? I’ve never soldiered just for profi t. During all my service in three reg-
ular armies, my pay was unimpressive by modern standards. I went from 
one fi ghting zone to another but I receive no pension. Nor do I have funds 
from another source. I’ve done it for the adventure, because I have always 
been a professional soldier, and because I love a fi ght. I’ve never been hap-
pier than in action.
In the context of the memoir, the epigraph identifi es the man (and in 
memoirs such as this it is always a man) of action as having greater 
moral signifi cance than the critic. This greater moral signifi cance is 
afforded in virtue of the value of action as opposed to inaction, of imper-
fect strife in service of a worthy cause. In other words, it is morally bet-
ter to perpetrate some immorality in the course of striving for a moral 
end than to perpetrate no immorality because one does not pursue that 
end in the fi rst place. McAleese is of course implying that he is the man 
of action and the reader the critic. Though the wars of white suprema-
cism in which he fought hardly constitute a worthy cause they are rep-
resented as wars against communism, as part of the Cold War in which 
the majority of McAleese’s readership at the time of publication would 
likely have been sympathetic to the West. One might in fact take this 
epigraph to be not merely establishing McAleese as an ethical peer in 
spite of the criminal wars and war crimes, but to be establishing him as 
an ethical superior, above and beyond the judgement of anyone who is 
not a man of action, who is a cold and timid soul. The epigraph serves 
to introduce the preface, in which McAleese explicitly establishes him-
self as the man of action (a category that excludes career soldiers). He 
addresses the reader both directly and in a direct manner, inviting re-
ception as a frank, sincere, and most importantly honest interlocutor. 
As such, the two parts of the front matter of the memoir constitute a 
statement of and an appeal for ethical peerage.
Like McAleese, Ashcroft takes pains to portray himself as a scru-
pulously honest narrator. He (2006: 3) is candid about the fi nancial re-
wards of his work as a mercenary, stating at the very beginning of the 
narrative: ‘We were in Iraq for the $500 a day we earned.’ The fi nancial 
rewards are always described as only one of two reasons, however, the 
other being his longing for a return to the adventure of military life. 
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Ashcroft refl ects on both the complexity of his motivation as well as the 
changes to that motivation at several places in the memoir. At the be-
ginning of chapter two, he (2006: 31) makes a direct appeal for ethical 
peerage in a manner similar to McAleese, addressing what he correctly 
imagines will be the main moral reservation for readers, the fact that 
mercenaries are literally paid to kill:
Civvies often ask if you enjoy killing people. They assume killing someone 
means wandering along the high street and slaughtering an innocent pass-
by with a loving family at home. But it’s not like that. The people I end up 
killing are always in the act of actively trying to kill me in some murderous, 
violent and agonising fashion. So, no, I don’t enjoy killing people, but, yes, I 
feel great afterwards because I feel the initial and immediate exhilaration 
at realising that I am alive and that the man who tried to kill me has failed.
This deployment of ethical peerage at the individual level is of course 
matched by the deployment of literary irresponsibility at the organisa-
tional level (discussed in the previous section) such that Ashcroft repre-
sents himself as seeking dangerous, well-paid work for a humanitarian 
cause rather than killing for money or killing for pleasure.
Wagemuller is by far the most arrogant and unremorseful of the 
three authors and narrates with the bombast, hyperbole, and bragga-
docio of a very vainglorious yarn-spinner. Notwithstanding his attitude 
and the extreme violence in which the narrative revels, he is careful 
to establish some kind of ethical community between himself and his 
readership. The fi rst paragraph of the Foreword (the fi rst part of the 
book narrated by Wagemueller rather than Elford) contains the follow-
ing passage (Elford 1971: 12):
I was a kopfjaeger—“headhunter,” as our comrades of the Wehrmacht used 
to call us. We were a special task force of the Waffen SS—the “fi ghting SS”—
which had nothing to do with concentration camps, deportations, or the ex-
termination of European Jewry. Personally I never believed that the Jews 
could or ever would become a menace to Germany and I hated no people, 
not even the enemy. I never believed in German domination of the world but 
I did believe that Germany needed lebensraum. It was also my conviction 
that Communism should be destroyed while still in its cradle. If my beliefs 
should be called “Nazism,” then I was indeed a Nazi and I still am.
There are two points of particular interest here. First, Wagemueller 
immediately distances himself from what, in the West at any rate, 
is usually considered the most morally abhorrent aspect of National 
Socialism, the Holocaust perpetrated against Europe’s Jewish popu-
lation. Second, he frames his Nazism in terms of anti-Communism, 
in much the same way as McAleese frames his own support of white 
supremacist regimes. For Wagemueller this has an additional signifi -
cance in that, as noted in the previous section, the book is part polemic 
against a US withdrawal from Vietnam. By distancing himself from 
what many readers will regard as the worst National Socialist atroci-
ties and aligning himself with anti-Communist sentiment, he makes a 
subtle (albeit typically arrogant) appeal to ethical peerage. In all three 
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examples, the authors (McAleese, Ashcroft, and Wagemueller) make 
explicit claims to ethical peerage with their readers, promoting concili-
ation in the face of apparent immorality (fi ghting for pleasure, killing 
for money, and National Socialism) and in so doing invite immunity 
from that immorality.
5. Moral economy
Norbert Götz (2015: 149) traces the fi rst use of ‘moral economy’ to 1729 
and notes the various denotations and connotations between then and 
historian E.P. Thomson’s distinction between political economy and 
moral economy in 1971. The denotation with which I am concerned is 
both subsequent and specifi c, Carroll’s (2013: 235) use of the term in 
explaining why many viewers have a pro-attitude to the fi ctional char-
acter Tony Soprano in the television series The Sopranos (1999–2007) 
when they would abhor his counterpart in reality. Carroll uses moral 
economy to describe the array of characters represented in a narrative 
that correspond and contrast with respect to their morality. Within the 
moral economy of The Sopranos, where most characters demonstrate 
signifi cant ethical defects, Tony is one of the least reprehensible. The 
moral economy frames viewer engagement with the series and produc-
es the pro-attitude in the following way (Carroll 2013: 243):
the pro-attitude that we extend to Tony Soprano is a result of the fact that 
we are allied to him. And we are allied to him because in the fi ctional world 
of The Sopranos alternative alliances would either be worse morally or ir-
relevant.
Carroll claims that the distinction between viewer responses to Tony 
and to his real-world counterpart is a consequence of the extent of the 
ethical defects represented in the fi ctional world rather than any es-
sentially fi ctional feature of the series. Moral economies are employed 
in both fi ction and nonfi ction.
Although Ashcroft recognises the complexity of his own motivations 
for joining Spartan and displays an ambivalent attitude towards both 
the CF invasion and the CPA occupation, he establishes a defi nitive 
moral economy of the insurgency. His (2006: 6) initial assessment of 
Iraq in 2003 is as ‘on the slippery slope to chaos’, which is—with the 
benefi t of hindsight—unfortunately completely accurate. Ashcroft uses 
‘terrorists’ (2006: 6) to describe his enemy, deliberately confl ating ‘Al 
Qaeda and radical Islamists’ (2006: 7) with ‘“fedayeen”’ (2006: 19) in-
surgents, all of whom are represented as exacerbating the chaos. The 
CF for whom the mercenaries are working, which in Ashcroft’s case 
is the US Army, is represented as for the most part well-intentioned, 
but poorly-led and badly-trained, in consequence of which they often 
involuntarily or unknowingly contribute to the chaos. Finally, the pri-
vate security contractors—particularly those working for Spartan—are 
framed as experienced professionals, the only faction whose interven-
tion always reduces the chaos. The distinction between the Americans 
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and the contractors is particularly effective in that it not only distanc-
es Ashcroft from the extensive civilian casualties of the insurgency, 
but also—somewhat ironically considering they are only there for the 
money—sets the contractors up as morally superior to the soldiers. 
While Ashcroft is often complimentary about individual US soldiers, he 
makes numerous criticisms of their lack of professionalism throughout 
the memoir, most of which are aimed at their lack of concern for civil-
ian casualties. The following three quotes are indicative:
(1) ‘the trigger-happy Americans at the CF checkpoint’ (Ashcroft 2006: 17).
(2) ‘I remembered reading that for every 15,000 rounds of ammo the US 
military fi res there is one fatality. This guy was doing his best to lower the 
average’ (Ashcroft 2006: 28).
(3) ‘The highest scoring killer of private security contractors up until then 
was, of course, the United States Army, seconded by terrorists, but only 
when catching stray terrorist fi re because they were driving along in traffi c 
mingled with a US patrol’ (Ashcroft 2006: 71).
Ashcroft’s moral economy clearly establishes the PMCs as the least 
morally reprehensible faction amidst the chaos and he makes a subtle 
but explicit claim to the moral superiority of the British military over 
the US military by comparing the rules of engagement in Northern 
Ireland with those in Iraq. Ashcroft has experience of the former as a 
British Army offi cer and experience of the latter as a private military 
contractor, which affords his view a certain authority. The most damn-
ing comparison is not, however between Northern Ireland and Iraq, but 
within Iraq, specifi cally the different strategies pursued by the British 
and US military components of the CF (Ashcroft 2006: 70–71):
Unlike the Brits mounting occupation and peacekeeping duties, the US 
troops in Iraq, especially in Baghdad in late 2003 and through 2004, were 
the same guys who fought their way in. The poor sods in the 3rd Infantry 
Division had a combat mindset not in any way conducive to peacekeeping. 
As for their anti-ambush drills, they had to be seen to be believed. Every 
weapon in the convoy unloaded in a 360° arc into anything that moved…
dogs, donkeys, children, buses, private contractors, you name it, got some.
In my discussion of the literary irresponsibility deployed by Ashcroft, I 
described how he framed the role of the PMCs as serving the interests 
of the civilian population rather than the CPA and the deployment of 
a moral economy of the insurgency both reinforces and is reinforced 
by the literary irresponsibility. The PMCs had nothing to with the in-
vasion, whose justifi cation is suspect, and do not dictate the terms of 
the occupation, which is being poorly-managed; instead, they use their 
superior skills and mindsets to ease the burden of the population by 
protecting journalists, petrol convoys, and the water supply. The moral 
economy and literary irresponsibility work in tandem to conceal the 
fact that the PMCs were essential to the maintenance of the occupa-
tion, the prolonging of the insurgency, and—in consequence—the suf-
fering of the civilian population.
Wagemueller establishes a simple moral economy between the Viêt 
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Minh and the Legion in which the atrocities of the former are always 
prior to and more extensive than the atrocities of the latter. Although 
the moral economy of atrocity is a straightforward us versus them, it is 
at times deployed in a subtle manner, for example in the two incidents 
that bookend the political debate I discussed previously: the Legion-
naires bayonet sixteen sleeping insurgents to death, but the Viêt Minh 
execute thirty villagers. The latter atrocity is, in numerical terms alone, 
almost twice as bad as the former. In the chapter that follows, Wagem-
ueller (Elford 1971: 238–239) states: ‘only the French “crimes” received 
blaring headlines. The Viet Minh atrocities (far more numerous and ex-
cessive) were given a few back-page lines once in a while.’ The Viêt Minh 
atrocities are unequivocally far more numerous and excessive than the 
French. The second aspect of the moral economy of atrocity is perhaps 
more effective as it seeks to absolve the Legionnaires from—or at the 
very least reduce their moral responsibility for—the atrocities. The rep-
resentation of French atrocities as a response to Viêt Minh atrocities 
(with an implied causal relation) is reiterated at several places in the 
narrative, and the following two are representative:
(1) ‘I was there at the beginning and I know that it was not the French who 
started the atrocities and what one may rightly call genocide. Genocide is a 
Communist specialty’ (Elford 1971: 70).
(2) ‘We were not any better than the Viet Minh and we knew it. But we did 
want to fi ght a clean war and we were not the ones who started the atroci-
ties. We only retaliated in kind. We could do nothing else’ (Elford 1971: 127).
The perspective on the atrocities is that they are both a response to the 
Communist atrocities and a necessary evil.
McAleese justifi es his active support of white supremacist gov-
ernments by means of establishing a moral economy that is similar 
to, albeit distinct from, Wagemueller’s. Where Wagemueller’s moral 
economy of atrocity is used to represent the atrocities the Legion com-
mits as being morally acceptable in virtue of being less extensive and 
a necessary response to the atrocities of the enemy, McAleese’s moral 
economy of settler colonialism is deployed as evidence for what consti-
tutes perhaps the most common apologia for colonisation, that it is in 
the interests of the colonised. McAleese uses the crimes of the military 
and civilian organisations fi ghting for black liberation to justify the 
continued existence of the two white supremacist governments, Ian 
Smith’s Rhodesian Front and P.W. Botha’s National Party. I take an 
example from each:
(1) ‘By the time I arrived, both Robert Mugabe’s ZANLA and Nkomo’s ZIP-
RA had carried out countless attacks on the local population and the blacks 
suffered more than the whites’ (McAleese 1993: 92).
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(2) ‘Ondjiva was a wreck by now, with few civilians left who could stand the 
constant battering and looting by FAPLA and SWAPO’ (McAleese 1993: 171).
The fi rst quote refers to the situation in Rhodesia in 1977 and the 
ZANLA and Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army insurgents. The 
second quote refers to the situation in Angola in late 1981. Ondjiva—a 
town near the South West African (now Namibian) border—was occu-
pied by the South African Defence Force to use as a forward operating 
base against the People’s Armed Forces of Liberation of Angola and the 
military wing of the South West African People’s Organisation. In both 
cases, it is made clear that white supremacist rule is safer and more 
secure for African civilians, inviting the reader to ally herself with the 
colonial settlers rather than the black insurgents, as the lesser of the 
two evils. In all three examples, the authors (Ashcroft, Wagemueller, 
and McAleese) establish moral economies (of insurgency, atrocity, and 
settler colonialism) that frame the author’s faction as the least morally 
reprehensible of the various options and thus invite moral immunity 
from their membership of those factions.
6. Conclusion
In the previous three sections I introduced three literary devices, La-
marque’s literary irresponsibility, John’s ethical peerage, and Carroll’s 
moral economy. I showed that all three of these devices were deployed 
in all three of the military memoirs for the purpose of moral immunity, 
i.e. for creating some kind of identifi cation, empathy, or sympathy with 
the authors in spite of their participation in criminal wars and war 
crimes. In Devil’s Guard, Wagemueller represents an interrogation as a 
political debate, appeals to the anti-communist sentiments of his read-
ers, and justifi es his atrocities as a necessary response to his enemy. In 
No Mean Soldier, McAleese conceals tragedy by means of comedy, rep-
resents himself as a man of action pursuing a worthy end, and frames 
settler colonialism as being in the interests of the African population. 
In Making a Killing, Ashcroft represents the PMCs as serving the Iraqi 
population, himself as seeking adventure in a humanitarian cause, and 
the PMCs as the only faction reducing the chaos in occupied Iraq. The 
three devices employed together in each memoir create a complex nar-
rative framework in which readers are invited to treat the author with 
what Carroll calls a pro-attitude—a vague, but useful term that in-
cludes a broad range of responses from actually identifying with the 
author to simply not regarding him as morally abhorrent. This invita-
tion to adopt a pro-attitude to the author will not of course be accepted 
by all readers, but the invitation itself evinces coherence and precision 
in its design and construction. The use of literary devices in service of 
moral immunity is thus very similar to—if not identical with—what 
one would expect to fi nd in literary works or canonical texts. I am not 
suggesting that these memoirs have equivalent literary value to, for 
example, the realist novels Lamarque mentions, but that the literary 
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devices they deploy should be taken seriously. I am, in other words, 
suggesting that the relationships among literary irresponsibility, ethi-
cal peerage, moral economy, and moral immunity constitute a literary 
aesthetics of war crime.
In the introduction, I described the literary aesthetic concern with 
the relationship between literature and morality as being focused on 
the value interaction debate, the question of whether a moral defect 
in a work is (also) an aesthetic defect. To date, the most popular an-
swers are from Carroll, who argues for a systematic relation between 
moral defects and aesthetic defects, and Eaton, who argues for a sys-
tematic relation between moral defects and aesthetic merits. The liter-
ary devices I have explored in this paper are all, in analytic aesthetic 
terms, aesthetic merits, understood as adding value to the memoirs 
when they are being judged as works of literature. Moral immunity—
i.e., some kind of acquittal, amnesty, or absolution from participating 
in criminal wars, war crimes, or both—is clearly a moral defect. The 
authors’ deployment of the literary devices for the purposes of moral 
immunity is thus evidence of a systematic relation between aesthetic 
merits and moral defects rather than evidence of a systematic relation 
between aesthetic merits and moral merits. I also described the liter-
ary critical concern with the relationship between literature and mo-
rality in the introduction, characterised as being focused on the rela-
tionship between literary responsiveness and ethical responsibility in 
the reception of texts. McNulty identifi es literary theory as associating 
sophisticated ambiguity with moral uncertainty and simplistic didac-
ticism with political conformity. The literary devices I have explored 
are all, in literary critical terminology, sophisticated instantiations of 
ambiguity employed for the purpose of political conformity, i.e. creat-
ing moral immunity from fi ghting for colonial or neocolonial powers. 
In consequence, they offer evidence for McNulty’s debunking of critical 
wisdom on the univocal relationship between literary ambiguity and 
moral uncertainty.
With this in mind, I consider the literary aesthetics of war crime 
proposed in this paper to provide a compelling (if not conclusive) so-
lution to both the value interaction debate (favouring Eaton’s robust 
immoralism) and the ethics of reading (favouring McNulty’s debunk-
ing). Setting aside these specifi cally disciplinary concerns, there re-
mains the perennial question of the relationship between literature 
and morality. In focusing on the way in which the authors of military 
memoirs use distinctively literary devices to achieve distinctively (im)
moral responses in their readers, the literary aesthetics of war crime 
demonstrates that the moral dimension of literature cannot and should 
not be ignored. In arguing for the way in which literary irresponsibil-
ity, ethical peerage, and moral economy are deployed in the service of 
moral immunity I have focused exclusively on immorality in literature. 
I make no claims about the way in which different literary devices are 
deployed in the service of moral ends such as compassion, respect, and 
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justice. The evidence from immorality is nonetheless suffi cient to show 
that literature should not be experienced, interpreted, or appreciated 
in isolation from its moral dimension. Whether one’s preference in ar-
ticulating literature is as an institution or a canon, the value of literary 
works or canonical texts for art, for culture, and for humanity is inex-
tricably bound up with their moral value.4
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